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In Indonesia the coming out of Islamic radicalism has
once more disquieted public life. Since the US assault
on Afghanistan following the September 11 terrorist
acts, Islamic youth organizations have been staging
anti-America protests throughout Indonesia's main
cities, showing the world a face of Indonesian Islam
different from the moderate one with which it is usu-
ally identified. The protests also show a different
face of young Indonesian activists. This time they do
not appear as the spirited bunch of the student
movement that ousted Suharto in 1998, but as fiery
campaigners for a jihad.
Indonesian Youth
and Islamic Revival
The young activists are far less numbered
nowadays but the impact of their actions is
no less considerable, especially in the con-
text of enduring crisis, with recovery de-
pending on stability. The question is how
this affects Indonesia's uplifted image as an
open, tolerant civil society, or the image of
the youth, fostered by their role in upsetting
an aged regime, as progressive harbingers
of change and modernity.
Many Indonesians consider the rise of Is-
lamic radicalism harmful to the process of
reforms if not a sheer setback to modernity.
But in fact it fits the era of reforms and in-
deed modernity quite well, if only to sub-
stantiate its predicament of plurality and
conflict. With Suharto's policy of strict con-
trol and engineering of the uniform nation-
state gone, marginalized voices have resur-
faced and are more expressive than ever. In
theory, this would give way to the formation
of a plural base for a diverse civil society. But
among the manifold voices that have been
raised in the past three years, those of Mus-
lim interest groups, both 'modernist' and
'traditionalist' (with new alliances being
forged the distinction is not always clear)
have been among the most vocal. As a re-
sult the era of reforms has seen a new Islam-
ic revival. Muslim parties have gained a larg-
er share in power, as confirmed with the re-
cent election of Hamzah Haz, leader of the
conservative Muslim party PPP for vice pres-
ident. Moreover, Islamic disposition has be-
come more prominent in public space.
There has been a marked rise in public dis-
plays of Islamic practice, idiom and activism,
while the mass media further added to the
publicity of Islamic discourse with a sub-
stantial increase in Islamic teachings ap-
pearing in print and on television. Even in
the world of show business an Islamic way
of life is exalted. Many celebrities have
turned devout, appear in Islamic dress as a
latest fashion item, or have their marriage
ceremonies arranged in Mecca; all of it in
great style and well documented by tabloid
m e d i a .
Yet the broad revival of Islam means
more than just a trend. Particularly in this
period of national transition with its endur-
ing crises of economic slump, political in-
stability and social breakdown, an Islamic
way of life is often taken up as an act of
consciousness; a deliberate choice mostly
made by urban, educated young people.
Considering that the urban youth are re-
putedly demoralized, inasmuch as many
appear to have lost faith in traditional and
societal institutions, a reinvigoration of an
Islamic disposition among them is remark-
able indeed. These days many students
prefer to join Islamic rather than universi-
ty-based, nationalist or leftist student or-
ganizations and a growing number of cos-
mopolitan young women choose to wear a
j i l b a b, Islamic head covering, in the public
sphere. Besides this being a matter of fol-
lowing one's peers, to be sure, it appears a
self-confident expression of a reconstruct-
ed identity, as an individual and member of
a peer group community that wishes to go
beyond traditional orders and contempo-
rary society as it developed under New
Order rule. In this regard their choice is dis-
tinctly progressive, synthesizing religion
with the tenor of liberality, social aware-
ness and enlightenment, characteristic of
the spell of reforms.
However, young people's attempts to re-
fashion and present a modern, tolerant
Muslim identity are complicated by ambigu-
ity and different opinions on what moderni-
ty and tolerance mean and where to put the
limits on these. Confusion particularly arises
in relation to issues of morality. Adding to
the confusion, altered attitudes towards re-
ligion and morality are also at stake in the
actions of some of their radical peers which,
according to several young people spoken
to, 'are giving Islam a bad name'. Anyhow,
existing tensions are certainly amplified in
these radicals' actions.
Moral wars
A striking illustration of such tension (ob-
served by the author Ayu Utami in D j a k a r t a,
September 2001) is the staining of a bill-
board advertisement along Jakarta's main
roads starring the popular actress and pre-
senter Sophia Latjuba. Her sensually pic-
tured figure had been covered with black
paint, leaving bare only the area around her
eyes in a meticulous attempt to make it look
as if Sophia, Indonesia's leading sex symbol
and personification of a cosmopolitan life-
style, was shrouded under an Islamic veil.
This meaningful act did not carry a signature
but it was clearly not an act of random van-
dalism. It rather seemed to fit into a series of
'small wars' that the radical youth have been
waging in the name of religion and morality.
Several radical Islamic youth organizations,
for instance Gerakan Pemuda Islam (GPI, Is-
lamic Youth Movement) and Front Pembela
Islam (FPI, Islamic Defence Front), both based
in Jakarta, have lately stepped up public ac-
tivity. This involved sporadic and seemingly
ad hoc actions that nonetheless show re-
markable coherence. While borrowing from
the repertoire of student activism as estab-
lished since the protests of 1998 and the
global repertoire of political Islam as imitated
from mass-mediated images of Palestinian
activism, their actions are notably marked by
a specific discourse of morality; or rather, im-
morality, often expressed through an idiom
of evil and sin. Radical groups have used such
idioms when engaging in political protest, as
when they joined the demonstrations at the
beginning of this year against then President
Wahid (whom they accused of corruption as
well as treason of Islam and covert commu-
nism). But a discourse of immorality has been
most of all pronounced in their actions
against social vices. These included violent
attacks on discotheques, bars, homosexual
venues and other sites of assumed perversi-
ty, and also public orations pointing the gen-
eral public to its sinful habits, such as the
consumption of pornography.
In addition, there has been a boost in the
campaign against an alleged revival of com-
munism, the historical enemy of Islamic
movements. Besides the spread of anti-
communism propaganda, for instance using
banners in public space that warn the peo-
ple to watch out for lurking communism (a
method reminiscent of New Order tactics),
this has also entailed occasional fights with
left-wing student organizations. Most
shocking to critics, however, has been the
act of book burning and threatening to
'sweep' from the market (semi-)leftist publi-
cations branded communist, recently con-
ducted by a broad alliance of several Islamic
youth organizations. As these publications
had only just been relieved from their ban
under Suharto's rule, this act was widely
condemned for undermining the new free-
dom and openness of reforms. But criticism
has hardly been discouraging. Now, linking
with the global mood of war, GPI, FPI and
their allies have found the ultimate infidel
foe in America, while Bin Laden has become
a cult hero whose holy war is seen by many
among them as worth dying for. Dozens
have already volunteered to join the Taliban
fighters in Afghanistan and are currently un-
dergoing military training at secret posts in
I n d o n e s i a .
But what kind of war and whose war are
they actually waging? Regarding them as al-
lies of Bin Laden does not make much sense.
Some Islamic youth organizations do have
ties with global Muslim affiliations with bases
in the Middle East, but this does not account
for most of their actions which are related to
distinctively local or national concerns. Then
assuming them to be pawns of certain off-
stage powers Ð relics of the New Order estab-
lishment that wish to upset the sitting gov-
ernment of President Megawati, which has
also been much hinted at Ð may also be mis-
leading. For the radical Islamic youth are not
the unitary bloc easily mobilized by third par-
ties. Most seriously, such explanations draw
attention away from the moral calls implicit
in their actions. Is their cause then, at least of
the rank and file of youths that feel urged to
join radical movements, essentially a moral
cause, impelled by the frustration of witness-
ing the rampant corruption among the pow-
ers that govern them and depravity in the so-
ciety they live in? Of course it is not that sim-
ple. But at least this suggests that their move-
ment does not stand completely apart from
the plights of present-day Indonesian society
and young people's experiences of them.
Challenges of modernity
The radical Islamic youth will find little
support among the mass of their Muslim
age-mates, although direct opposition has
been notably absent; maybe for fear for vio-
lent retaliation, or maybe because young
people struggling with their own Muslim
identity are unsure of how to deal with the
bearing of their radical peers. In any case, to
understand what an Islamic revival among
the youth in present-day Indonesia means,
we should avoid interpretations that dis-
connect 'radicals' from 'moderates', or for
that matter 'political' from 'popular' expres-
sions of religion. It makes more sense to ex-
amine how young people are variously re-
sponding to the conditions in which radical
movements arise Ð urban environments
where the maelstrom of change is most
pressingly felt by younger people Ð and to
relate this to their experiences of religion in
daily life. Then we may get a better picture
of the tensions and dilemmas that face GPI
activists, students drawn to Islamic mysti-
cism, or young feminists wearing a j i l b a b, in
attempting to reconcile old and new de-
mands and desires of life in an increasingly
plural world.
In Indonesia as elsewhere, the crumbling
of establishments together with changing
conditions of modernity confront young
people with new challenges, such as the
problem of balancing tolerance and criti-
cism in a world fraught with incongruity and
conflict. It should come as no surprise that
religion comes to play an important role in
taking up these challenges, or that the
meaning of religion itself will alter in the
process. 
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